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Although a great deal is now known about how people mentally represent individuals and 
groups, less attention has been paid to the question of how interpersonal relationships are 
represented in memory. Drawing on principles of categorization, this paper reports an 
investigation into how we mentally represent the relationships of others. In three experiments, 
evidence for assimilation effects following social exclusion (and subsequent categorization) 
is found. Experiment 1 uses a judgment paradigm to demonstrate that social exclusion 
influences the perception of interpersonal closeness. Experiments 2 and 3 employ a memory 
confusion paradigm to establish that representations of relationship partners are assimilated 
following the exclusion of a third party. 
KEYWORDS: social exclusion, relationship representation, categorization
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Cognitive Consequences of Perceiving Social Exclusion
Human nature is inherently social, but it is not indiscriminately so. As people navigate 
through their social lives, they embrace some relationships and forego others. As social 
perceivers, we are aware of this selectivity. We know that, to the extent that they are able to 
do so, people pick and choose the individuals with whom they develop relationships. Because 
few people have an infinite capacity for investing time and energy in new social relations, 
being selective in building one’s social network is a necessity for most humans.
One by-product of being socially selective is that people must, at times, reject
potential relationships and exclude prospective relationship partners. How do we, as social 
perceivers, interpret and represent the social relations that result from the inclusion of some 
people and exclusion of others? A long tradition of research has examined how we mentally 
represent individuals and groups (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1989). 
Surprisingly, there has been comparatively little research into the question of how we process 
information about the social relationships of others.
From the perspective of social perceivers, the ability to identify the nature of others’ 
social relationships is critical. Knowledge regarding others’ social relations allows perceivers 
to more accurately predict the consequences of their behavior. If Jeff knows that Jill has a 
relationship with Jack, but mistakenly perceives it as a platonic friendship, he may 
erroneously conclude that Jill is receptive to his romantic overtures. Similarly, if Keith is 
angry with Karl, but knows that Karl’s good friend is Kevin, a 200-pound body-builder, he 
may sensibly decline to confront Karl. 
The way in which we understand others’ relationships was recognized, in earlier 
years, as an important issue within social perception. Heider (1946) suggested that people are 
inclined to perceive balance in social relations. Given a triad of persons (Anna, Barbara, and 
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Caroline) if Anna has positive relationships with both Barbara and Caroline, people tend to 
assume a positive relationship between Barbara and Caroline as well. However, if Anna is 
positively associated with Barbara but negatively associated with Caroline, people assume a 
negative relationship between Barbara and Caroline. Thus, Heider’s balance theory suggests 
that people are motivated to perceive social relationships as consistent with each other. 
Although this important observation is now widely accepted (Abelson, 1983), little has been 
done to further our understanding of how we mentally represent the social relationships of 
others.
One important exception to this rule is a model proposed by Sedikides, Olsen, and 
Reis (1993) in which they conceptualized relationships as natural categories. This 
conceptualization implies that social perceivers may use relationships to organize information 
in memory, just as they do for group-related information. In building the case for 
relationships as categories, Sedikides et al (1993) reported a series of experiments which 
demonstrated that participants’ recall of information they had learned about a number of 
individuals was organized around relationships – items associated with two people were more 
likely to be retrieved in sequence if the individuals were identified as members of a married 
couple than if they were identified as acquaintances, fans of the same football team, or 
randomly paired individuals. Moreover, participants were more likely mistakenly attribute 
information about one member of a couple to the other member than they were to make 
similar errors about individuals who were not identified as belonging to the same couple.
The results reported by Sedikides et al (1993) suggest that information about close or 
interdependent relationships may be processed in a similar manner as information about other 
types of categories. In their studies, the perceived closeness of relationships was manipulated 
by identifying some individuals as married couples. However, as noted by the authors, other 
cues may be equally important in determining whether members of a relationship are viewed 
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in categorical terms: ‘the interesting question here is not which characteristics define a close 
relationship, but rather which qualities lead observers to spontaneously connect relationship 
partners in memory’ (p. 81).  In other words, what leads social perceivers to treat some 
relationships (but not others) as categories?
Properties of Categorization
When it comes to social categories, the way a target group is perceived is profoundly 
affected by the presence of other groups in the same social context. For example, the salience 
of intergroup comparisons may lead to increases in the perception that members of the same 
group are similar (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998; Corneille & Judd, 1999; Rothbart, Davis-Stitt, 
& Hill, 1997) and that members of different groups are dissimilar (Doosje, Haslam, Spears, 
Oakes, & Koomen, 1998; Judd & Park, 1993).
Such effects can be attributed to the operation of two related processes that result 
from categorization (Corneille & Judd, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Taylor et al, 1978; 
Turner et al, 1987). First, categorizing others into groups leads to between-group contrast –
that is, members of one group are viewed as more different from members of another group 
than they would in the absence of categorization (Doise, 1990; Long & Manstead, 1997). 
Second, categorization leads to within-group assimilation – that is, members of the same 
group are seen as more similar to each other than if they had not been categorized (Simon & 
Brown, 1987). Research on these categorization effects has, logically enough, been limited to 
the study of social groups – groups varying in size but typically consisting of at least four 
individuals (Taylor et al., 1978) or of indeterminate size (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). 
Yet, the same processes of assimilation and contrast may equally apply to interpersonal 
relationships in which categorization occurs. 
Social Exclusion and Categorization
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It is proposed here that social exclusion is an important cue that may determine 
whether a relationship is viewed in categorical terms. Although perceivers may categorize 
relationship partners on the basis of a number of cues (e.g., an explicit commitment to each 
other, see Sedikides et al, 1993), social exclusion may among the most salient. The 
observation that members of a relationship have actively excluded others may serve to 
highlight the boundary between outsiders and the relationship itself. Just as the mere presence 
of a second group within a social context influences the extent to which a target group is 
subject to categorization effects (i.e., assimilation and contrast), the mere presence of non-
members of a relationship may similarly lead to relationship members being perceived as a 
category. 
Although this possibility has not yet been explored in the context of perceptions of 
interpersonal relationships, recent theorizing by Pickett and Brewer (2005) supports the view 
that exclusion leads to categorization effects when it comes to intergroup relationships. In 
particular, Pickett and Brewer suggest that an important reason that some members of a group 
may socially exclude others is to maximize their own feelings of inclusion in the group.  The 
exclusion of other ‘marginal’ group members allows individuals to assert their own 
established position within the group (see also Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002).
Similarly, individuals who identify with a social group are more likely exclude others from 
the group than are those who do not identify with the same group (Castano, Yzerbyt, 
Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002). This ‘in-group over-exclusion effect’ (Yzerbyt, Leyens, & 
Bellour, 1995) refers to the tendency to exclude from the in-group any individuals whose
group membership is in doubt and is thought to be linked to in-group identification (see also 
Blascovich, Wyer, Swart, & Kibler, 1997).  Thus, in managing their perceptions of an 
important in-group, individuals may use social exclusion as a way of maximizing in-group 
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solidarity and distinctiveness from other groups. In other words, social exclusion contributes 
to within-group assimilation and between-group contrast.
Social exclusion plays an important role in drawing group boundaries and hence in 
determining how social groups are perceived. When it comes to dyadic relationships, 
exclusion may operate in a similar way. Current theories do not address the possibility that 
categorization effects occur when social exclusion takes place on an individual rather than a 
group level. There are, however, reasons to suppose that contrast and assimilation effects may 
follow from social exclusion. For example, according to Aron’s Self-Expansion Model (Aron 
& Aron, 1986), individuals in close relationships develop overlapping (or assimilated) 
representations of themselves and their relationship partners (a process referred to as self-
expansion). While SEM does not go into detail about the cognitive mechanisms through 
which another person is assimilated to the self, research stemming from the model has 
identified factors associated with self-expansion. For example, shared experiences that are 
novel (Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna, & Heyman, 2000), humorous (Fraley & Aron, 2004) 
or defined by mutual self-disclosure (Aron, Melinat, Aron, et al., 1997) are all associated 
with greater interpersonal closeness. What these studies have in common is that factors that 
lead to increased feelings of closeness are those that increase the perception of uniquely 
shared knowledge and experiences.
 Why does uniquely shared experience generate interpersonal closeness, whereas 
more mundane or commonplace experiences do not (Aron et al., 2000)? One possibility is 
that awareness that a shared experience is unique creates a category boundary. That is, those 
who have shared an unusual experience may view themselves as members of a different 
category than those who have not had that experience. Two strangers who meet in Chicago 
and learn that they were on the same island in Thailand during the 2004 tsunami may feel a 
bond based on that experience, particularly when surrounded millions of people who do not 
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share it. By spontaneously categorizing people into those who shared the experience and 
those who did not, the tsunami survivors find themselves within the category boundary, and
therefore may assimilate each other into their self-concepts.
Likewise, sharing personal information (e.g., self-disclosure) has been identified as a 
key factor contributing to closer interpersonal relationships (e.g., Altman & Taylor, 1973; 
Collins & Miller, 1994). Indeed, research by Aron et al (1997) suggests that self-disclosure 
plays a causal role in producing feelings of closeness between individuals with no prior 
connection to each other. Conveying personal information about others (i.e., gossip) plays a 
similar role in building social bonds (e.g., Fine, 1977). As when people share unusual 
experiences, sharing personal information that is not commonly known may lead to 
categorization based on uniquely shared knowledge. 
Thus, categorization may be critical in producing effects described by SEM. 
Perceiving a relationship as unique may lead to categorization, which in turn results in 
assimilation of individuals within the relationship. In the preceding examples, ‘outsiders’ are 
not explicitly excluded from the relationship, but a distinction is drawn between those within 
the relationship and those outside of it. If such distinctions produce assimilation between self 
and other representations, the extent of assimilation should be even greater when exclusion is 
intentional and explicit.
This analysis may apply equally well to the issue of how we represent social 
relationships to which we do not belong. When social perceivers observe that social exclusion 
has occurred in a relationship, they may draw a category boundary between the members of 
the relationship that have engaged in the exclusion, and the individual(s) whom they have 
excluded. As a result of drawing this boundary, perceivers may form a representation of 
exclusive relationships such that their members are assimilated to each other. Assimilation 
may influence subjective judgments such that members of exclusive relationship are believed 
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to be closer or more similar. It may also influence information processing such that 
perceivers process information about members of exclusive relationships in more similar 
ways.
Experiment Overview & Hypotheses
Three studies are described below that investigate these possibilities. In Experiment 1, 
participants were presented with brief scenarios, each describing an encounter among a 
number of people. In some of these encounters, two individuals shared personal information 
with each other while explicitly withholding that information from a third person. Thus, in 
some instances, participants learned that the relationship being depicted was characterized by 
social exclusion. In other scenarios, no explicit exclusion took place. Participants’ subjective 
perceptions of these relationships were then assessed. In Experiments 2 and 3, cognitive 
assimilation and contrast effects were explored more directly using a memory confusion 
paradigm. In all cases, social exclusion was expected to result in assimilation, as evidenced 
by judgments of relationship closeness (Experiment 1) and by the extent of differentiation 
between relationship members (Experiments 2 and 3). 
Experiment 1
In many social contexts, individuals learn about and form impressions of a wide 
variety of targets: other individuals, other groups, as well as others’ friendships or close 
relationships. As suggested above, the representations that one builds of others’ relationships 
may be influenced by the social exclusiveness of their interactions. The ability to identify the 
nature of others’ relationships is important because it provides information on a number of 
issues. Is the relationship permeable (e.g., is it possible to join the relationship)? Can one 
member of the relationship be expected to share information or characteristics (e.g., 
knowledge, goals, or motives) with the other? Can one relationship partner be held 
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responsible for the acts of the other? The ability to make accurate inferences about the 
closeness of a particular relationship helps to inform all of these questions.
In Experiment 1, the effect of social exclusion on the perception of social 
relationships was investigated by exposing participants to brief scenarios about a number of 
social relationships, some of which were characterized by social exclusion. According to the 
reasoning introduced above, exclusive relationships should be viewed as closer than non-
exclusive ones. In addition, to assess the effect of exclusion on inferences other than 
closeness, participants were asked to make a number of additional judgments following each 
scenario. In particular, participants were asked to judge the extent to which the relationship 
was unique and reciprocal, and the extent to which members of the relationship were similar 
in terms of their personalities and backgrounds. To the extent that social exclusion is a cue to 
view a relationship as a category, members of exclusive relationships should be viewed as 
closer and more similar, and the relationship should be characterized as more reciprocal and 
more unique.
Method
Participants
Sixty students (20 males, 40 females) at the Free University of Amsterdam (NL) 
participated in this study in exchange for €2.50 (approximately $3.50). Participants were 
tested individually in isolated cubicles. The experiment took approximately 10-15 minutes to 
complete. 
Design and Materials
The study involved a within-participants design, in which participants were exposed 
to three exclusion conditions (exclusion, inclusion, or control). Twelve scenarios were 
constructed for use in this study.1 Each scenario depicted an interaction among two or three 
individuals of the same sex (half of the scenarios in each condition portrayed female targets 
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while the other half portrayed male targets). Different forenames were used in each scenario, 
so that each interaction would be perceived as independent of the others. In the control 
condition, one of the people (Target 1 or T1) conveyed personal information with one other 
person (Target 2 or T2). In the exclusion condition, T1 conveyed the same information to T2, 
while ensuring that a third person (Target 3 or T3) was not present during the interaction. In 
the inclusion condition, T1 conveyed the information to both T2 and T3. The specific 
behaviors were counterbalanced such that, across participants, all behaviors appeared in 
exclusion, inclusion, and control conditions and involved both male and female protagonists.
Procedure
Participants were introduced to a study on how people perceive the relationships of 
others. They were informed that they would read about a number of different relationships, 
and that they would make judgments about the nature of each relationship. Participants then 
read each of the 12 scenarios, the order of which was randomized. After each scenario, 
participants were asked to judge the degree of closeness between T1 and T2 and between T1 
and T3. They were then asked to judge the relationship between T1 and T2 on a number of 
dimensions. Specifically, participants rated the likelihood that T1 would share the same 
information with others (uniqueness), the likelihood that T2 would share similar information 
with T1 (reciprocity), and the similarity of T1 and T2 in terms of their personalities and 
backgrounds. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all to 9 = extremely).
Results2
Closeness of T1 and T3 (manipulation check)
Participants’ ratings of the closeness of T1 and T3 were analyzed using a paired 
samples t-test in which exclusion and inclusion conditions were compared. The analysis 
indicated a significant difference such that participants rated the two targets as significantly 
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closer when T3 was included in the interaction (M = 6.34, s= 0.92) than he or she was 
excluded (M = 3.90, s = 1.26), t(59) = 11.75, p < .001 d = 2.21.
Closeness of T1 and T2
The critical dependent measure was participants’ perceptions of the closeness of T1 
and T2. A repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess the 
effect of exclusion on perceived T1-T2 closeness. This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of exclusion condition, F(2, 118) = 16.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .21.3 Follow-up paired 
samples t-tests indicated that participants rated the T1-T2 relationship as significantly closer 
in the exclusion condition than in either the control condition, t(59) = 4.07, p < .001, d = .53
or the inclusion condition, t(59) = 5.73, p <.001, d = .78, the difference between which was 
marginally significant, t(59) = 1.70, p < .10, d = .26. See Table 1 for means and standard 
deviations.
Uniqueness, Reciprocity, and Similarity
In addition to rating the closeness of the T1-T2 relationship, participants judged the 
relationship on the uniqueness and reciprocity of the relationship, and the similarity of the 
two interactants. Each of these ratings was examined using the same analytic strategy 
described above. In each case, there was a significant main effect of exclusion such that 
higher ratings were obtained in the exclusion condition than in the inclusion or control 
conditions, smallest F(2, 118) = 3.85, p < .03, ηp2 = .06 (see Table 1).
In addition, indices of exclusion and inclusion effects on similarity, uniqueness, and 
reciprocity ratings were calculated by subtracting ratings in the control condition from those 
in the exclusion and inclusion conditions, respectively. These indices were entered as 
covariates in a repeated-measures ANCOVA comparing closeness ratings among the three 
exclusion conditions. Although inclusion effects on uniqueness (F(2, 106) = 5.38, p < .01. ηp2
= .09) and reciprocity (F(2, 106) = 2.71, p < .08, ηp2 = .05) emerged as significant or 
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marginally significant covariates, the main effect of exclusion condition remained significant 
even with all covariates included in the analysis, F(2, 106) = 3.37, p < .04, ηp2 = .06. 
Importantly the within-subjects contrast comparing the exclusion condition against the 
inclusion and control conditions was also significant, F(1, 53) = 6.29, p < .02, ηp2 = .11.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that social exclusion is used as a 
cue to treat relationships as categories – participants judged exclusive relationships to be 
significantly closer than non-exclusive relationships. Thus, these results support the proposal 
that social exclusion leads to categorization-based assimilation of relationship partners. 
Further evidence is provided by the finding that social exclusion influences perceptions of 
relationship reciprocity and uniqueness, and judgments of similarity between the relationship 
partners. These results are consistent with the view that exclusion affects perceived closeness 
by encouraging perceivers to categorize T1 and T2 into a separate category than T3 
(suggested by higher similarity ratings) and consequently assimilating T1 and T2 (suggested 
by higher ratings of the relationship’s uniqueness and reciprocity).
While the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the framework presented earlier, 
a number of limitations must be addressed. First, a potential criticism of Experiment 1 
concerns its reliance on self-report measures obtained from a within-participants design. 
Because of the design, explicit comparisons among scenarios were possible, which raises the 
possibility that demand characteristics contributed to the results. 
In addition, although the judgment measures used in Experiment 1 are consistent with 
the premise that social exclusion encourages categorization, resulting in increases in 
perceived relationship closeness, they do not provide a direct investigation of how 
relationship partners are mentally represented. The finding that partners are perceived as 
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closer under exclusion conditions than under inclusion or control conditions does not 
necessarily indicate that participants’ representations of them have been assimilated. 
Moreover, if assimilation did occur, it is still possible that factors other than exclusion 
per se were responsible the finding that T1 and T2 were perceived as closer when they 
excluded T3. For example, participants may have formed relatively negative evaluations of 
T1 and T2 because they perpetrated the exclusion of T3 (towards whom they may have 
reacted with greater sympathy). Although no data relating to participants’ evaluations of the 
targets are available to address the possibility, it may be that such differing evaluations of T1 
and T2 versus T3 contributed to categorization and hence influenced the perceived closeness 
of the three targets.
Experiments 2a and 2b were conducted to address concerns about alternative 
interpretations of the data (by using a fully between-participants design) as well as to provide 
a more direct measure of how people mentally represent exclusive and non-exclusive 
relationships. 
Experiment 2
If one’s mental representations of two people are assimilated, one should be less 
likely to differentiate between information related to those people. For example, Mashek, 
Aron, and Boncimino (2003), asked participants to judge three different lists of personality 
trait words. In each list, they judged whether the trait described either themselves, a close 
other, or a familiar but non-close other. Later, participants were presented with words from 
all three lists and were asked to indicate the person for whom they had judged each of them. 
In analyzing participants’ errors, Mashek and colleagues observed that participants were most 
likely to make errors in which words judged for the self and words judged for the close other 
were confused. 
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Experiment 2 adapted the paradigm used by Mashek et al (2003; see also Sedikides et 
al, 1993) to assess whether representations of two people in a relationship are less 
differentiated (i.e., assimilated) when the relationship socially excludes others. If one’s 
mental representations of two people in a relationship are assimilated, one should be more 
likely to confuse information encoded in relation to one relationship partner for that encoded 
in relation to the other. According to the framework outlined earlier, this should be the case 
when perceivers encode information about two individuals who exclude a third person (e.g., 
T1 and T2 in the previous experiment).
Experiment 2a
If, as expected, participants make more memory confusions involving members of 
socially exclusive relationships than members of non-exclusive relationships, this would 
provide direct evidence of assimilation and support the view that exclusion is a cue used in 
categorization. However, at least one competing account must be considered. Specifically, 
social exclusion, as manipulated in Experiment 1, is partially confounded with shared 
distinctiveness. In the first experiment, two targets in an exclusive relationship share 
distinctive features (e.g., the fact that they engaged in exclusion and the fact that they have 
information unknown by others) that are not shared by the excluded target.  
These distinctive features may contribute to assimilation effects in two ways. First, 
prior research (e.g., Nelson & Miller, 1995) suggests that perceivers use distinctive features 
as a basis for categorization.  Thus, participants may categorize T1 and T2 because they share 
distinctive features, which may contribute to assimilation effects. According to this view, the 
observation that two targets share any distinctive feature is sufficient to elicit categorization –
the feature need not have anything to do with social exclusion. Thus, shared distinctiveness –
and not social exclusion – may result in categorization.
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A second way in which shared distinctiveness may affect assimilation is by increasing 
perceived similarity among the relationship partners after they have been categorized. 
According to Tversky’s (1977) model of similarity, the greater the number of distinctive 
features shared among category members, the greater the perceived similarity will be. This 
view suggests that targets who shared distinctive features because of circumstances having 
nothing to do with exclusion might be viewed as more similar, which may have contributed 
to the results found in the first two experiments. Thus, shared distinctiveness – and not social 
exclusion – may lead to assimilation effects once categorization had occurred.
The possibility that shared distinctiveness or similarity alone leads to assimilation 
effects is argued against by the results of Experiment 1, which indicated that target similarity 
was not a significant covariate, nor did target similarity, relationship reciprocity, or 
relationship uniqueness account for the effects of exclusion on perceived closeness. When all 
of these variables were controlled for, the effect of exclusion on perceived closeness 
remained significant. 
To provide further evidence that exclusion produces unique effects on relationship 
representation beyond that accounted for by shared distinctiveness, Experiment 2a includes a 
direct comparison of an exclusion condition with one in which targets share distinctive 
features not related to exclusion. If categorization and assimilation are due to shared 
distinctiveness rather than exclusion per se, then assimilation effects should also be found in 
this condition.
A second goal of Experiment 2a is to investigate the role of intention in producing 
exclusion-based categorization. Experiment 1 utilized a manipulation that involved 
intentional acts of social exclusion. Yet, there may be instances where social exclusion occurs 
due to situational factors rather than the explicit intentions of those who engage in it. The 
preceding analysis implies that while intentionality may make exclusion more salient, it may 
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not be strictly necessary for exclusion-based categorization to occur. To examine the role of 
intention more closely, a further condition was included in Experiment 2a in which two 
targets exclude a third person as the result of situational factors.
Method
Participants.  Eighty members of the Plymouth (UK) community (29 males and 51 
females) participated in this and an unrelated experiment in exchange for £3 (approximately 
$6). The experiment lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Design & Procedure. The experiment employed a between-participants design, in 
which five groups of participants received different information about a social relationship 
(inclusion, intentional exclusion, unintentional exclusion, shared distinctiveness, or control).
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were informed that they would be taking 
part in a study on how people perceive social relationships. Participants were initially 
introduced to three people, Anna, Janine, and Sandra (hereafter T1, T2, and T3) who were 
described as members of the same social group. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of five relationship information conditions. Participants in all conditions learned that the three 
targets belonged to a student group and had known each other for one year. Those in the 
control condition were given no further information. Participants in the shared distinctiveness 
condition also learned that, by coincidence, T1 and T2 shared the same birthday. Participants 
in the other three conditions learned that T1 and T2 spend a lot of time together discussing 
events from their own lives as well as the lives of others in their group. Those in the inclusion
condition learned that T1 and T2 often tried to include T3 in their discussions. Those in the 
intentional exclusion condition learned that T1 and T2 always made a point of keeping T3 out 
of their discussions. Those in the unintentional exclusion condition learned that T1 and T2 
wanted to include T3 in their discussions, but because T3 worked and lived out of town, she 
was never present during their discussions. 
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After reading the information about the relationships among the three targets, 
participants were informed that they would form impressions of two of the three targets (T1 
and T2) by learning a series of personality traits that described each of them. Participants 
were then presented with a list of 20 personality trait words that described T1 and a second 
list of 20 trait words that described T2. All words were randomly selected from Anderson’s 
(1968) list of personality trait words. The order of the T1 and T2 lists was counterbalanced. 
After viewing the two lists, participants were asked to take a few minutes to think about their 
impressions of the two individuals. Participants then received instructions for a recognition 
task. Participants were presented with the 40 personality trait words that had been presented 
during the preceding two lists as well as with 40 trait words that had not been previously 
presented. Participants were instructed to indicate whether each word had described T1 or T2, 
or had not been presented at all, by pressing one of two keys on the computer keyboard. 
Results
Words presented during the recognition task can be classified as ‘target 1’ (words that 
described T1), ‘target 2’ (words that described T2), and ‘new’ (words that were not presented 
at all). Thus, each response can be classified as either a ‘hit’ (correctly identifying the target 
who had been described by the word), a ‘confusion’ (attributing a word that had described 
one target to the other target), a ‘miss’ (failing to recognize that a word had described either 
target), a ‘false alarm’ (indicating that a new word had described either of the two targets) or 
a ‘correct rejection’ (correctly indicating that a new word had not been presented). Because
misses are the complement of the combination of hits and confusions, and similarly correct 
rejections are the complement of false alarms, only hits, confusions, and false alarms were 
analyzed. 
Memory confusion errors were calculated as the proportion of times (out of a total of 
40 trials) that a trait that had been presented for one target was attributed to the other. A one-
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way ANOVA comparing the five conditions revealed a significant main effect of relationship 
information, F(4, 79) = 4.41, p < 01, ηp2 = .19. Planned comparisons were conducted to 
compare the intentional exclusion condition to each of the other four conditions. These 
analyses indicated that whereas confusion rates did not significantly differ in the intentional 
exclusion and unintentional exclusion conditions, t(75) = .65, ns, d = .17, rates were 
significantly higher in the intentional exclusion condition than in either the no information
(t(75) = 3.19, p < .01, d = 1.27) or inclusion (t(75) = 3.32, p < .01, d = 1.21) conditions, and 
marginally higher than in the shared distinctiveness condition, t(75) = 1.84, p < .07, d = .60.
Subsequent analyses indicated that exclusion condition had a marginally significant 
effect on hit rates, F(4, 79) = 2.37, p = .06, ηp2 = .11 but  a non-significant effect on false 
alarms F(4, 79) = 1.98, p > .10, ηp2 = .10). The complete set of means and standard deviations
are presented in Table 2.
Experiment 2b
As noted above, participants in the distinctiveness condition did not significantly 
differ in their confusion rates (although the exclusion condition was significantly different 
from the control condition whereas the distinctiveness condition was not).  Thus, it is not 
possible to completely rule out the possibility that perceptions of shared distinctiveness 
contributed to the exclusion effects reported in Experiment 2a. The purpose of Experiment 2b 
was to provide an explicit test of the extent to which perceptions of shared distinctiveness 
mediate the effect of exclusion on assimilation as assessed by memory confusions. 
Method
Participants. Twenty-two members of the Plymouth (UK) community (14 females, 8 
males) took part in this and an unrelated experiment in exchange for £3 (approximately $6). 
Design and Procedure. Experiment 2b involved a two-group between-participants 
design. Participants were randomly assigned to either the exclusion or control condition. The 
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procedures were identical to those described in Experiment 2a, with the exception that 
participants answered additional questions after the recognition task. Specifically, 
participants were asked to rate how unusual it is for two people to socially exclude another 
person, how meaningful social exclusion is to the people who do it, how similar T1 and T2 
were to each other, and how unique the relationship between T1 and T2 was. All ratings were 
made on a 9-point scale (1=not at all, 9=very much).
Results
Memory confusions, hits, and false alarms were calculated as described in Experiment 
2a. In order to assess whether the effects of exclusion on memory errors were replicated, a 
series of independent-samples t-tests were conducted.  Of primary importance, participants in 
the exclusion condition made significantly more memory confusions (M = .28, s = .16) than 
did those in the control condition (M  = .15, s = .09), t(20) = 2.43, p < .03, d = 1.00. In 
addition, participants in the exclusion condition also produced fewer hits (M = .45, s = .18) 
than did those in the control condition (M = .65, s = .11), t(20) = 3.12, p < .01, d = 1.34. 
However, there was no significant difference in false alarm rates, t(20) = .54, ns, d = .24.
In order to examine the role that perceptions of distinctiveness may have played in 
producing assimilation, an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was carried out in which 
participants’ ratings of the unusualness and meaningfulness of social exclusion were entered 
as covariates. Neither covariate proved to be significant (largest F(1, 22) = 1.25, p > .25, ηp2
= .07). Moreover, the significant of exclusion condition remained significant, F(1, 22) = 5.98, 
p < .03, ηp2 = .25) when those covariates were added. A similar analysis was conducted using 
relationship-specific measures of shared distinctiveness (participants’ ratings of how similar 
T1 and T2 were and of how unique their relationship was). Again, neither covariate was 
significant, largest F(1, 22) = 1.31, p > .25, ηp2 = .02, while the main effect of exclusion 
remained marginally significant, F(1, 22) = 3.82, p < .07, ηp2 = .23.
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Discussion
Experiment 2a and 2b provided important clarifications of the results found in 
Experiment 1. First, they provide direct evidence that mental representations of individuals in 
relationships characterized by social exclusion are assimilated. Thus, while the results of 
Experiment 1 may have been clouded by the possibility of demand characteristics, that 
interpretation becomes less plausible in light of the memory confusion results found in 
Experiments 2a and 2b. 
In addition, as noted earlier, an alternative interpretation of exclusion-based 
assimilation effects is that the responses of participants in the exclusion conditions were, in 
fact, the result of targets’ sharing distinctive features rather than of exclusion per se. The 
results of Experiments 2a and 2b do not support this interpretation. Participants in the 
exclusion condition made more memory confusions than participants in either the control or 
inclusion conditions. In contrast, participants in the shared distinctiveness condition produced 
no more memory confusions than did those in the control and inclusion conditions, as would 
be expected if categorization of T1 and T2 resulted from any indication of shared 
distinctiveness. Simply being similar on a distinctive dimension is not sufficient to produce 
categorization or assimilation effects. Indeed, although participants in the distinctiveness 
condition of Experiment 2a did not significantly differ from those in either the 
control/inclusion or the two exclusion conditions, the results of Experiment 2b strongly 
suggest that perceptions of distinctiveness are not responsible for the observed exclusion 
effects. This finding is consistent with existing research on categorization (Murphy & Medin, 
1985; Nosofsky, 1986; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992) which suggests that people are 
more likely to form and/or perceive categories when the potential basis for categorization is 
perceived as meaningful or diagnostic. In the present studies, acts of social exclusion are 
likely to be such meaningful and diagnostic cues to view targets in categorical ways. In 
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contrast, although similarity is certainly an important factor influencing the categorization 
process under some circumstances (Tversky, 1977), it is not – by itself – enough to trigger 
categorization in the present context.
The results of Experiment 2a also demonstrate that exclusion need not be intentional 
for it to produce categorization effects. The differences in memory confusions produced by 
participants in the unintentional exclusion condition and those in the control and inclusion 
conditions did not reach significance. However, the results (in particular, the finding that 
unintentional and intentional exclusion led to similar levels of memory confusions) suggest 
that exclusion may produce categorization effects even when it results from situational 
factors rather than from the will of those who exclude. 
The results of the shared distinctiveness and unintentional exclusion conditions, taken 
together, imply a more complex picture of social exclusion and categorization-based 
assimilation effects. In contrast to the alternative account suggested by other theories (e.g., 
Nelson & Miller, 1995; Tversky, 1977), simply sharing distinctive features is not sufficient in 
this context to trigger categorization or to result in assimilation. Thus, social exclusion does 
appear to play a unique role in these processes. However, the results of this experiment also 
suggest that intentional or active exclusion may not be necessary to produce the effects 
observed in previous studies. Albeit to a lesser extent, unintended exclusion also resulted in 
an elevated level of memory confusions, suggesting that it, too, produces categorization and 
subsequent assimilation.
Experiment 3
While the results of Experiment 2 provided direct evidence that perceivers assimilate 
their impressions of individuals in socially exclusive relationships, they did not address the 
possibility of contrast between those and impressions of excluded individuals. The analysis 
offered earlier suggests that one’s representation of a third person should be more 
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differentiated (i.e., contrasted) when he or she is excluded from a relationship than when he 
she is not explicitly excluded. To the extent that one’s mental representations of two people 
are contrasted, one should be less likely to confuse information encoded in relation to one of 
those people for that encoded in relation to the other. This should occur when perceivers 
encode information about one of the two members of a relationship along with a third person 
who has been excluded (e.g., T1 and T3 in the previous experiments).
To test this hypothesis, participants were given information about two friends who 
either excluded a third person or not. Participants formed an impression of two targets (either 
the two friends, or one of the friends and the excluded person) by reading personality trait 
words that described each of them. After the trait lists were presented, participants performed 
a recognition task in which they identified whether each of the words had been presented in 
the description of one or the other target. 
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty students (51 male and 69 female) at the Free University of 
Amsterdam (NL) participated in this experiment in exchange for €2.50. The experiment 
lasted for approximately 15 minutes.
Design and Procedures
The experiment involved a between-participants design, in which participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three exclusion conditions (exclusion 1, exclusion 2, or control). 
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were informed that they would be taking 
part in a study on how people perceive social relationships. Participants were initially 
introduced to three people, Anna, Janine, and Sandra (T1, T2, and T3) who were described as 
members of the same social group. Participants in the exclusion 1 and the exclusion 2 
conditions learned that T1 and T2 spent a lot of time together discussing events from their 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Cognitive Consequences   24
own or other group members’ lives and that they always made sure that T3 was not present 
when they had these discussions. Participants in the control condition were not given this 
information.
Participants were then informed that they would form impressions of two of the 
individuals. Participants in the control and exclusion 1 conditions were to form an impression 
of T1 and T2 (i.e., the two targets who belonged to the central relationship), while those in 
the exclusion 2 condition were to form an impression of T1 and T3 (i.e., one target who 
belonged to the central relationship along with the target who was excluded from the 
relationship). Participants were presented with two lists of 20 trait words, each list describing 
one of the two targets. The order of the lists and the targets described by each were 
counterbalanced across participants. Within each list, the trait words were presented one at a 
time, for 2 seconds each (separated by a 1-second pause) on a computer screen, with the 
target’s name remaining on the screen to the left of each word. After reading both lists, 
participants completed a brief distracter task after which they completed a recognition task 
similar to that described in Experiment 2a. 
Results
Memory confusions, hits, and false alarms were calculated as described in Experiment 
2a. To assess the extent to which participants differentiated between information learned 
about the two targets, confusions were analyzed using a one-way ANOVA in which 
exclusion condition was entered as the independent variable. This analysis yielded a 
significant main effect, F(2, 117) = 11.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. Planned contrasts confirmed 
that participants in the exclusion 1 condition made more memory confusions than did those in 
either the control condition, t(117) = 2.67, p < .01, d = .49, or the exclusion 2 condition, 
t(117) = 4.72, p < .001, d = .87, which also significantly differed from one another, t(117) = 
2.04, p < .05, d = .38. Means and standard deviations can be found in Table 3. 
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Subsequent analyses indicated a further significant effect of exclusion condition on 
hits (F(2, 117) = 5.71), p < .01, ηp2 = .09, such that participants in the exclusion 1 condition 
produced a lower proportion of hits than those in the control, t(117) = 2.28, p < .03, d = 2.28,
or exclusion 2 conditions, t(117) = 3.30 p < .01, d = .61, which did not significantly differ, 
t(117) = 1.02, p > .30, d = .19. This finding is, perhaps, not surprising in light of the fact that 
participants may have believed that target words had actually described the other target 
person. Given the absence of any effect of exclusion condition on false alarms, F(2, 117) = 
1.10, ns, ηp2 = .02, the extent to which exclusion decreases recognition accuracy appears to be 
due to an increase in memory confusions rather than a general impairment on memory 
performance. 
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated Experiments 2a and 2b by utilizing a memory confusion 
paradigm to investigate the extent to which participants’ mental representations of individuals 
with different types of relationships overlap (i.e., are assimilated). If one’s representations of 
two individuals overlap, one should be less able to distinguish between information related to 
one versus the other of them. Consistent with expectations, evidence was found for a greater 
degree of assimilation when the relationship excluded others than when it did not. This was 
indicated by a greater number of memory confusions in the exclusion condition than in the 
control condition.
On the other hand, participants formed relatively well-differentiated representations of 
two people who they viewed as being on opposite sides of the relationship boundary. When 
participants learned about one of the two relationship members along with a third person who 
had been actively excluded from the relationship, they made relatively few memory 
confusion errors. This suggests that participants were well able to distinguish between what 
they knew about the two targets. 
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Thus, these results support the hypothesis that social exclusion leads to assimilation of 
people in the exclusive relationship. When a boundary is recognized between two people in a 
relationship and others outside of it, one’s representations of those people merge such that 
information processed in relation to one person is treated as if it applied to the other. These 
results are also consistent with those of the first experiment, which indicated that people 
perceive socially exclusive relationships as closer, more unique and more reciprocal, and 
members of such relationships as more similar. 
In contrast, among participants in the exclusion 2 condition, the ability to distinguish 
between information learned about two targets was enhanced. This suggests that when the 
two targets fall on opposite sides of a boundary (e.g., one is included and one is excluded), 
those targets become more distinctive from each other. Again, this supports the idea that 
social exclusion leads to categorization, this time by demonstrating that contrast effects occur 
for individuals who are excluded. 
General Discussion
The experiments reported here support the hypothesis that perceivers use information 
regarding social exclusion to draw category boundaries between different sets of individuals. 
When two members of a relationship actively include another person in their interactions, that 
third person is included within the relationship-based category. In contrast, and more 
interestingly, when the third person is actively prevented from joining the relationship, the 
category boundary is strengthened, with the excluded individual on the opposite side of the 
boundary. As a result of strengthening the category boundary, assimilation effects are more 
likely to occur. That is, the perceiver’s representations of individuals within the relationship 
are more likely to merge. 
In Experiment 1, perceivers’ judgments about the closeness of various relationships 
reflected these processes. Participants consistently judged two individuals to be closer when 
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they actively excluded others from their interactions, compared to when others were included 
in those interactions or were not mentioned at all. This pattern emerged despite the fact that 
the interactions themselves were identical across conditions – the only difference among 
conditions was whether a third person was or was not excluded from them. Thus, perceivers 
appear to use information about exclusion to draw inferences about interpersonal closeness. 
These inferences may be based upon the psychological distance of the perceivers’ stored 
representations of relationship partners.
Experiments 2 and 3 provided more direct evidence about how relationships are 
represented in memory. When two individuals in a relationship socially exclude a third 
person, perceivers’ representations of them become less differentiated, leading to a greater 
likelihood that information related to one relationship partner will be misattributed to the 
other. In contrast, the results of Experiment 3 suggested that representations of an excluded 
individual may become more differentiated from those of the relationship partners, leading to 
a lower likelihood of memory confusions involving the excluded individual.
The current work represents an initial foray into studying the consequences of 
exclusion for the mental representation of social relationships. While the topic of social 
exclusion has received substantial attention in recent years (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1990; 
Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003), this work 
has focused primarily on the consequences of exclusion for those who have been excluded. 
As argued at the outset of this paper, social exclusion may also play an important role in 
shaping our perceptions of other people’s relationships. These perceptions may in turn have 
important consequences for our judgments and expectations of individuals involved in those 
relationships. Until now, this question has been neither asked nor answered in the 
psychological literature. Thus, the research presented here provides first insights into how 
impressions of social relationships are formed.
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These studies raise further questions about the consequences of how relationships are 
represented. As suggested earlier, the perceived closeness of a relationship has repercussions 
for how we judge other aspects of the relationship. Experiment 1 suggests that, if a 
relationship is seen as particularly close, perceivers may judge its members to be more
similar in terms of their personalities and social backgrounds. A related possibility is that 
closer relationships may be viewed as less permeable, which may influence our behavior 
towards members of the relationship. We may be less inclined to pursue or develop 
relationships with members of a relationship (whether it is a friendship or a romantic 
partnership) that is seen as exclusive, close, and impermeable. The question of whether 
socially exclusive relationships are viewed as not only closer but also less permeable is open 
to further investigation.
A further implication that bares consideration concerns the assumptions perceivers 
make about members of exclusive relationships. If relationship partners are presumed to 
share common characteristics – such as knowledge and goals – perceivers may hold one 
partner responsible for the actions of the other. Thus, the exclusiveness and consequent 
closeness of a relationship may influence judgments of collective responsibility (e.g., Lickel, 
Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003) and assumptions about collective emotions (Lickel, Schmader, 
& Barquissau, 2005).
Is Explicit Exclusion Necessary and Sufficient?
The theoretical framework adopted here suggests that the perception of social 
exclusion triggers a categorization process. This raises the question of whether exclusion, by 
itself, is sufficient to elicit categorization. To what extent need the individuals engaged in 
exclusion share a common bond independent of the act of exclusion? The data presented here 
do not directly address this question, as the perpetrators of exclusion were always members 
of a social relationship. However, recent research by Zadro, Williams, and Richardson (2005) 
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has demonstrated that strangers who are induced to socially exclude another person develop 
greater feelings of closeness to each other (see discussion below). Thus, exclusion in the 
absence of pre-existing bonds may be sufficient to produce the effects described here. 
Finally, there remain questions about what cues people use to determine whether 
social exclusion has taken place. In the studies reported here, exclusion is direct and explicit 
– there is little ambiguity about whether or not relationship partners have excluded someone 
else. However, there may be more subtle cues from which perceivers infer social exclusion. 
For example, observing that two individuals consistently share confidential information with 
each other may lead one to infer that they exclude others, because others are not explicitly 
included in their confidences. Further, perceivers may detect nonverbal cues that imply social 
exclusion, such as covert eye contact (i.e., two people taking sidelong glances at each other; 
see Kurzban, 2001) or speaking at low volumes to prevent others from overhearing). 
Exclusion and the Self
Social exclusion has been subject to social psychological study from a number of 
perspectives. For example, Baumeister, Williams, and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 
1990; Eisenberger et al, 2003) have generated a large body of research demonstrating various 
consequences of being socially excluded or ostracized. Although the bulk of this work 
concerns the experience of those who are targets of exclusion, Williams has suggested a 
number of motives for engaging in social exclusion. For example, social exclusion may be a 
tool used by individuals or groups to exert behavioral control on others (e.g., to punish 
deviant behavior). In addition, Kurzban and Leary’s (2001) evolutionary approach argues that 
the social exclusion of individuals and groups may serve an adaptive function in that it allows 
people to avoid others who may be poor partners for social exchange or who may pose threats 
to our physical well-being. Though intriguing, neither analysis addresses the possible 
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consequences of engaging in social exclusion for how one perceives and mentally represents 
relationships from which others are excluded. 
The data presented here, however, suggest clear predictions on this issue. If 
witnessing social exclusion by others leads to categorization of the individuals involved, it is 
perhaps even more likely that engaging in exclusion would do the same. Thus, one who 
actively excludes others from a relationship may experience greater intimacy with the other 
person in the relationship. In support of this notion, recent research from the author’s 
laboratory suggests that leading individuals to view a friendship as exclusive has a direct 
effect on their experience of closeness within that relationship. In addition, Zadro, Williams, 
and Richardson (2005) established that participants who role played an act of social exclusion 
reported, in some cases, greater feelings of belonging than did those who role played an act of 
inclusion or an act of verbal dispute. Thus, the social exclusion of others from one’s 
relationships may serve the important function of increasing the extent to which one feels a 
bond with one’s relationship partners.
Mechanisms Underlying Exclusion Effects
A further question arising from this work concerns the stage at which categorization-
based assimilation effects occur. In all studies presented in this paper, exclusion information 
was presented first, with memory and judgment measures collected later. Particularly in 
Experiments 2 and 3, this procedure ensured that categorization had taken place before 
further impressions of the target individuals had been formed. Thus, the assimilation of those 
individuals likely occurred prior to encoding the trait information about them. One potential 
criticism of this method is that participants were simply less motivated to discriminate 
between individuals who were included, which might call into question the conclusion that 
the patterns of memory confusions were due to assimilation.
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This raises the question of how pre-existing representations (i.e., impressions of 
familiar others) are influenced by exclusion. If exclusion leads to assimilation of those within 
a relationship, similar effects should be observable even when exclusion information is 
provided after impressions of the relevant individuals have been formed. This distinction 
provides an important direction for further research.
Finally, if exclusion information is an important cue to relationship and group 
membership, it may be transmitted in a number of ways, including those that extend beyond 
verbal communication. Particularly when communicating the exclusiveness of our own 
relationships, we may take advantage of other channels such as eye contact (mutual eye gaze 
as well as joint attention; e.g., Kurzban, 2001) and behavioural mimicry (e.g., Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003).
Conclusions
In sum, social exclusion provides important information about others’ – and perhaps 
our own – relationships. Exclusion exerts a strong influence on how relationships are 
mentally represented. These representations may subsequently influence judgments of 
closeness along with other relationship characteristics, which may in turn have important 
consequences for how we as perceivers judge and behave towards members of those 
relationships.
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Footnotes
1. For exploratory purposes, the scenarios included instances where the communication 
shared between targets concerned one of the targets him/herself (i.e., self-disclosure) as well 
as instances where it involved a third party (i.e., gossip). These variations had no significant 
effects nor did they interact with any other variable. Hence, they are not discussed here.
2. Preliminary analyses involving both participant gender and target gender were carried 
out for this study as well as all subsequent studies. These analyses produced no significant 
main effects of gender (either participants’ or targets’) or interactions involving gender 
(either participants’ or targets’).
3. Although the goal of brevity precludes their full reporting, it is worth noting that the 
effect of exclusion on perceived closeness has been replicated in three other experiments 
including a further 170 participants, F’s = 19.55 to 44.00, all p’s < .001; d = .46 to .59 
(average d = .53).
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Table 1.
Mean ratings of T1-T2 relationship closeness, uniqueness, reciprocity and similarity 
(Experiment 1). Higher numbers indicated greater closeness, reciprocity, and similarity and 
less uniqueness. Means within a row marked with different superscripts are significantly 
different from each other (p < .05).
Exclusion Control Inclusion
Closeness 7.02a
(0.86)
6.56 b
(0.87)
6.33b
(0.91)
Uniqueness 4.61a
(1.28)
5.72 b
(1.21)
6.05 b
(1.26)
Reciprocity 6.24 a
(0.94)
6.06 ab
(1.19)
5.83 b
(0.97)
Similarity 6.15 a
(0.97)
5.91 b
(1.00)
5.78 b
(0.99)
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Table 2.
Mean proportion of recognition responses in Experiment 2a (hit = correctly stating that a 
word had described the appropriate target person; confusion = incorrectly stating that a word 
had described the inappropriate target person; false alarm = incorrectly stating that a non-
presented word had described either target person). Means within a row marked with 
different superscript are significantly different (p < .05).
Intentional 
Exclusion
Unintentional 
Exclusion
Shared 
Distinctiveness
Inclusion No 
Information
Hit 0.46 ab
(0.15)
0.37 b
(0.17)
0.43 ab
(0.14)
0.43 ab
(0.08)
0.53 a
(0.17)
Confusion 0.34 a
(0.10)
0.32 a
(0.13)
0.28 ab
(0.10)
0.23 b
(0.08)
0.23 b
(0.07)
False Alarm 0.37 a
(0.15)
0.38 a
(0.21)
0.30 a
(0.18)
0.26 a
(0.13)
0.27 a
(0.14)
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Table 3.
Mean proportion of recognition responses in Experiment 3, (hit = correctly stating that a 
target word had described the target person; confusion = incorrectly stating that a lure word 
described the target person; false alarm = indicating that a new word had described the target 
person). Note that participants in the Exclusion 1 and Control conditions carried out the 
recognition task for targets T1 and T2 (the two members of the central relationship) whereas 
participants in the Exclusion 2 condition carried out the task for targets T1 and T3 (one 
member of the central relationship and the person who had been excluded from it). Means 
within a row marked with different superscripts are significantly different from each other (p
< .05).
Exclusion 1 Control Exclusion 2
Hit 0.61 a
(0.14)
0.68 b
(0.11)
0.70 b
(0.12)
Confusion 0.49a
(0.16)
0.40 b
(0.13)
0.33 c
(0.15)
False Alarm 0.37 a
(0.15)
0.38 a
(0.18)
0.33 a
(0.15)
